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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the degree to which Americans are saving optimally for retirement. Our
standard for assessing optimality comes from a life-cycle model that incorporates uncertain
lifetimes, uninsurable earnings and medical expenses, progressive taxation, government transfers,
and pension and social security benefit functions derived from rich household data. We solve every
household’’s decision problem from death to starting age and then use the decision rules in
conjunction with earnings histories to make predictions about wealth in 1992. Ours is the first study
to compare, household by household, wealth predictions that arise from a life-cycle model that
incorporates earnings histories for a nationally representative sample. The results, based on data
from the Health and Retirement Study, are striking – we find that the model is capable of accounting
for more than 80 percent of the 1992 cross-sectional variation in wealth. Fewer than 20 percent of
households have less wealth than their optimal targets, and the wealth deficit of those who are
undersaving is generally small.
John Karl Scholz
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  There is considerable skepticism in public policy discussions and in the financial press that 
Americans are preparing adequately for retirement.  A quotation from the Wall Street Journal 
captures a popular view:  
A long time ago, New England was known for its thrifty Yankees.  But that was before the 
baby boomers came along.  These days, many New Englanders in their 30s and 40s, and 
indeed their counterparts all over America, have a different style: they are spending heavily 
and have sunk knee-deep in debt. ... A recent study sponsored by Merrill Lynch & Co. 
showed that the average middle-aged American had about $2,600 in net financial assets.  
Another survey by the financial-services giant showed that boomers earning $100,000 will 
need $653,000 in today’s dollars by age 65 to retire in comfort – but were saving only 31 
percent of the amount needed.  In other words, the saving rate will have to triple.  Experts 
say the failure to build a nest egg will come to haunt the baby boomers, forcing them to 




  Assessing the adequacy or optimality of wealth accumulation is difficult, since it requires 
some standard against which to measure observed behavior.  Several authors use augmented life-
cycle models for this standard, simulating the expected distribution of wealth for representative 
household types (see, for example, Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995; and Engen, Gale, and 
Uccello, 1999).
2  While augmented life-cycle models provide natural benchmarks, these 
researchers do not fully assess the adequacy (let alone the optimality) of wealth accumulation.  
They derive optimal distributions of wealth (or wealth-income ratios).  But given underlying 
                                                 
1“Binge Buyers: Many Baby Boomer Save Little, May Run Into Trouble Later On: They Don’t Build Nest Eggs 
Nearly Rapidly Enough for an Easy Retirement,” Bernard Wysocki Jr., 6/5/95, A1 Wall Street Journal.  Wolff 
(2002) concludes “retirement wealth accumulation needs to be improved for the vast majority of households.”   
2 Kotlikoff, Spivak, and Summers (1982); Moore and Mitchell (1998); and Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) examine 
saving adequacy by comparing data to financial planning rules of thumb.  But a rule of thumb cannot describe 
optimal behavior for households with widely different patterns of earnings realizations, even if preferences are 
homogeneous.  Hamermesh (1984); Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998); and Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg 
(2001) make inferences about adequacy from consumption changes around retirement.  But, for the reasons given in 
Aguiar and Hurst (2003) and Hurd and Rohwedder (2003), it is difficult to make inferences about adequacy or 
optimality from patterns of consumption changes around retirement.  
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model parameters, expectations, and earnings realizations, the models have household-specific 
implications for optimal wealth accumulation.  These household-specific implications have not 
been studied.   
  We examine the degree to which households are optimally preparing for retirement by 
constructing a stochastic life-cycle model that captures the key features of a household’s 
consumption decisions.  Our model incorporates many behavioral features shown by prior work 
to affect consumption, including precautionary savings and buffer stock behavior (Deaton, 1991; 
Aiyagari, 1994; Carroll, 1997).  It incorporates asset-tested public transfers (Hubbard, Skinner, 
and Zeldes, 1995), where benefits vary over time and by household size.  Our model incorporates 
end-of-life uncertainty and medical shocks (Palumbo, 1999).  We also incorporate a stylized, 
time-varying progressive income tax that reflects the evolution of average effective federal 
income tax rates over the period spanned by our data.  Households in the model form realistic 
expectations about social security, which depends on lifetime income; pension benefits, which 
depend on income in the final year of work; and earnings.  We incorporate detailed data from the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) on family structure and age of retirement (treating both as 
exogenous and known from the beginning of working life) in calculating optimal life-cycle 
consumption profiles.   
  Our approach has other distinctive features.  Most important, we calculate household-
specific optimal wealth targets, using data from the HRS.  A crucial input to our behavioral 
model is 41 years of information on earnings realizations drawn from restricted-access social 
security earnings records.  The timing of earnings shocks can cause optimal wealth to vary 
substantially, even for households with identical preferences, demographic characteristics, and   3
lifetime income.  Hence, it is essential for life-cycle models of wealth accumulation to 
incorporate earnings realizations, at least to the extent model implications are compared to actual 
behavior.   
  We find that over 80 percent of HRS households have accumulated more wealth than their 
optimal targets.  These targets indicate the amounts of private saving households need to solve 
their life-cycle planning problem, given social security and defined benefit pension expectations 
and realizations.  For those not meeting their targets, the magnitudes of the deficits are typically 
small.  In addition, the cross-sectional distribution of wealth in 1992 closely matches the 
predictions of our life-cycle model.  
I.  The Health and Retirement Study   
  The HRS is a national panel study with an initial sample (in 1992) of 12,652 persons and 
7,702 households.
3  It oversamples blacks, Hispanics, and residents of Florida.  The baseline 
1992 study consisted of in-home, face-to-face interviews of the 1931-1941 birth cohort and their 
spouses, if they are married.  Follow-up interviews were given by telephone in 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000, and 2002.  For the analyses in this paper we exclude 379 married households where one 
spouse did not participate in the 1992 HRS, 93 households that failed to have at least one year of 
full-time work, and 908 households where the highest earner began working full time prior to 
1951.
4  Our resulting sample has 6,322 households. 
                                                 
3 An overview of the HRS is given in a Supplementary issue of the Journal of Human Resources, 1995 (volume 30).  
There, 22 authors discuss and assess the data quality of many dimensions of the initial wave of the HRS.   
4 We drop the first group because we do not have information on spousal, and hence household, income.  We drop 
the second group because we do not have information on transfer payments in years prior to the HRS survey and 
therefore we cannot model the lifetime budget constraint.  We drop households where the highest earner started 
working before 1951 for computational reasons.  Our procedures to impute missing and top-coded data are 
considerably more complicated when initial values of the earnings process are missing.  Details for the earnings 
imputations are given in Appendix I.  
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  The survey covers a wide range of topics, including batteries of questions on health and 
cognitive conditions; retirement plans; subjective assessments of mortality probabilities and the 
quality of retirement preparation; family structure; employment status and job history; 
demographic characteristics; housing; income and net worth; and pension details.  
Wealth Measures in the HRS 
 Households  typically  maintain living standards in retirement by drawing on their own 
(private) saving, employer-provided pensions, and social security wealth.  To study the degree to 
which households optimally accumulate wealth, therefore, we need accurate measures of these 
wealth components.   
  Net worth (private saving) is a comprehensive measure that includes housing assets less 
liabilities, business assets less liabilities, checking and saving accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual 
funds, retirement accounts including defined contribution pensions, certificates of deposit, the 
cash value of whole life insurance, and other assets, less credit card debt and other liabilities.  It 
excludes defined benefit pension wealth, social security wealth, and future earnings.
5  The 
concept of wealth is similar (and in many cases identical) to those used in other studies of wealth 
and saving adequacy. 
  We use the “Pension Present Value Database” that Bob Peticolas and Tom Steinmeier 
kindly made available on the HRS World Wide Web Site to calculate the value of defined benefit 
pensions and, as described below, estimate the household’s expectations of future pension 
                                                 
5 We account rigorously for defined benefit pensions, social security, and future earnings in the household decision 
problem.  We do not model the purchase and service flows that result from consumer durables since we do not have 
data on durables.  We do not include term life policies in net worth because we do not have information on premium 
payments and, more importantly, a comparison of data from the HRS and Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest 
Old suggests that a substantial fraction of term life policies are dropped in retirement.   Those that are not dropped 
have a median value of less than $7,000.   5
benefits.
6  The program makes present value calculations of HRS pensions for wave 1 (1992) 
respondents for nine different scenarios, corresponding to the Social Security Administration’s 
low, intermediate and high long-term projections for interest rates, wage growth rates, and 
inflation rates.  We use the intermediate values when calculating DB pension wealth.
7   
HRS Earnings Data 
  Restricted access social security earnings data provide a direct measure of earnings 
realizations and lifetime income, and, as described below, they are used to estimate household’s 
expectations of future earnings.  They also allow us to simulate accurately social security 
benefits for the respondent and spouse or for the couple, if the benefit would be higher.
8   
  Two issues arise in using earnings information.  First, social security earnings records are 
not available for 22.8 percent of the respondents included in the analysis (we have 10,523 
respondents in 6,322 households).  Second, the social security earnings records are top-coded 
(households earn more than the social security taxable wage caps) for 16 percent of earnings 
observations between 1951 and 1979.  Beginning in 1980, censoring is not an issue, because we 
have access to uncensored W-2 earnings records from 1980-1991.   
We impute earnings histories for those individuals with missing or top-coded earnings 
records assuming the individual log-earnings process  
       0 , 0 0 ,
*
0 , i i i x y ε β + ′ =  
                                                 
6 See http://www.umich.edu/~hrswww/center/rescont2.html. The programs use detailed plan descriptions along with 
information on employee earnings.  We use self-reported defined-benefit pension information for households not 
included in the Peticolas and Steinmeier file.  The assumptions used in the program to calculate the value of defined 
contribution (DC) pensions – particularly the assumption that contributions were a constant fraction of income 
during years worked with a given employer – are likely inappropriate.  Consequently, we follow others in the 
literature (for example, Engen et al., 1999, p. 159) and use self-reported information to calculate DC pension wealth. 
7 The intermediate Social Security Administration assumptions are 6.3 percent for interest rates, 5 percent for wage 
growth, and 4 percent for inflation. 
8 Appendix II provides details of the social security calculations.  
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where 
*
, it y  is the log of observed earnings of the individual i at time t in 1992 dollars, xi,t  is the 
vector of i's characteristics at time t, and the error term εi,t  includes an individual-specific 
component  i α , which is constant over time, and an unanticipated white noise component, ui,t . 
We employ random-effect assumptions with homoskedastic errors to estimate equation (1). 
  We estimate the model separately for four groups:  men without a college education, men 
with some college, women without a college education, and women with some college.  Details 
of the empirical earnings model and coefficient estimates are given in Appendix I.  In Appendix 
I we also describe how we use the model of individual earnings and a Gibbs sampling procedure 
to impute earnings for individuals who refuse to release their social security earnings histories to 
the HRS,
9 and for earnings in years when social security earnings records are top-coded.  The 
Gibbs procedure is conceptually appealing as it allows us to use information from the entire 
sequence of individual earnings to impute missing and top-coded earnings. 
  Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the HRS sample.  Mean (median) earnings in 1991 
of HRS households are $35,263 ($28,298), though note that 13 percent are not in the paid labor 
force when interviewed in 1992.  The mean (median) present discounted value of lifetime 
household earnings is $1,691,104 ($1,516,931).
10  Retirement consumption will be financed out 
                                                 
9 We repeated our central empirical analyses dropping individuals who refused to release their social security 
records and generated nearly identical results to those reported in the paper.  Brief details are given in the sensitivity 
analysis, section 4.6. 
10 When calculating present discounted values of earnings, social security or defined benefit pension wealth, we 
discount the constant-dollar sum of earnings (social security, or pensions) by a real interest rate measure (prior to 
1992, we use the difference between the CPI-W and the 3-month Treasury bill rate; for 1992 and after we use 4 
percent).   7
of pension wealth (mean is $105,919, median is $17,371); social security wealth (mean is 
$106,714, median is $97,150); and nonpension net worth (mean is $250,513, median is 
$107,000). 
  Our empirical procedures result in social security replacement rates that are somewhat lower 
than those discussed in Engen et al. (1999).  The replacement rate is defined as equaling annual 
social security benefits divided by the average of the final five years of earned income (prior to 
retirement), multiplied by 100.  The median for our sample of married couples is 38.4 percent.  
Those with less than a high school diploma have a median of 43.7 percent.  Those with a high 
school diploma or some college have a median rate of 39.3 percent.  College graduates have a 
median rate of 31.6 percent, while those with more than a college degree have a median rate of 
29.8 percent.  Engen et al. cite figures from Grad (1990) who reports that an average 
replacement rate for couples was roughly 55 percent in 1982, but social security has become less 
generous since then.  Because we use social security earnings records and a close approximation 
to the social security benefit rules, our measure compared to those in Grad (1990) shows how 
replacement rates have changed over time. 
  Figure 1, which shows the median levels of defined benefit pension wealth, social security 
wealth, and net worth (excluding DB pensions) in each lifetime income decile, highlights the 
reason we account rigorously for social security in our model.  Social security exceeds the 
combined value of pension and nonpension net worth in the bottom three deciles of the lifetime 
income distribution.  Private net worth significantly exceeds the value of social security only in 
the top two deciles of the lifetime income distribution.  The metaphor of the “three-legged stool,” 
in which retirement income security is supported by the three legs of social security, employer-
provided pensions, and private wealth accumulation, appears to apply only to households in the  
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top 70 percent of the lifetime income distribution because low-income workers lack employer-
provided pension coverage. 
II.  A Model of Optimal Wealth Accumulation 
  We solve a simple life-cycle model, augmented to incorporate uncertain lifetimes, 
uninsurable earnings, uninsurable medical expenses, and borrowing constraints.  The unit of 
analysis is a household, which can be married or single.
11 Individuals within a household live to 
a maximum age D.  Between ages 0  and  1 S −  individuals are children and make no 
consumption decisions.  Adults start working at age S , have exogenous labor supply, and give 
birth to as many as n children at ages  12 , ,  ...,  n B BB .  Earnings depend on age (which affects 
work experience) and a random shock that may be correlated across time.  Each period, adults 
decide how much to consume and how much to save for the future. 
 Households  retire  exogenously at the end of age R  and face a probability of death in each 
remaining year of life.  In retirement, they start receiving health shocks that are allowed to be 
correlated across ages. They receive income from social security, defined benefit plans (if 
covered) and assets. Social security receipts depend on total earnings during the preretirement 
period.  Defined benefit pension receipts are a function of the household’s last earnings receipt 
before retirement.   
II.1.  A Household's Maximization Problem 
 
 A  household derives utility  () Uc from period-by-period consumption in equivalent units, 
where  (, ) jj gA K  is a function that adjusts consumption for the number of adults  j A  and children 
j K  in a household at age j . Let  j c  and  j a  represent consumption and assets at age  j . With   9
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The expectation operator E  denotes the expectation over future earnings uncertainty, uncertainty 
in health expenditures, and length of life. 
  Consumption and assets are chosen to maximize expected utility subject to the constraints,
 12 
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The first two equations define taxable income for working and for retired households.  The last 
two equations show the evolution of resources available for consumption.  In these constraints  j e  
denotes labor earnings at age j, and  () τ ⋅  is a tax function that depicts total tax payments as a 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 We do not model marriage or divorce.  Married households become single only if a spouse dies.  Single 
households remain single forever.  
12 The model implies a borrowing constraint in the sense that asset balances are positive in every period.  The 
intuition is the following: for the problem to be well-specified, the household should not be allowed to die with debt, 
regardless of the stochastic sequence of earnings (and medical) shocks.  Since earnings shocks in every period can 
get arbitrarily close to zero, the household should be in a position to repay debt even if they get a long sequence of 
near-zero earnings draws – failing this, consumption goes to zero and marginal utility of consumption goes to 
infinity, which is clearly not optimal (since the utility function satisfies the Inada condition). Consequently, the 
household will maintain a non-negative asset position in every age. The same logic applies in retirement, with the 
exception that rather than earnings uncertainty, the individual now faces uncertainty in medical expenses and 
lifespan.  
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function of taxable income,  j y . () SS ⋅  are social security receipts, which are a function of 
aggregate lifetime income, and  ( ) DB ⋅  are defined benefit receipts, which are a function of 
earnings received at the last working age.   () T ⋅  denotes means-tested transfers, which depend on 
earnings, social security benefits and defined benefit pensions, assets, the year, and the number 
of people in the household.  Medical expenditures are denoted by  j m  and the interest rate is 
denoted by r . 
II.2.  Recursive Formulation of the Life-Cycle Problem 
 
  The life-cycle problem may be solved backwards from age D, given the terminal condition 
at that age. There are two sources of uncertainty in retirement – lifespan and medical expenses. 
We start by describing the problem for retired married households. The problem for single 
households is dealt with in a similar fashion. 
II.2.1.  The Retired Household’s Problem
13 
 
  A retired household between the ages R  and D obtains income from social security, 
defined benefits, and preretirement assets.
14  The dynamic programming problem at age  j  for a 
retired, married household with both members alive at the beginning of age  j  is given by 
,
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13 To define a household’s retirement date for those already retired, we use the actual retirement date for the person 
in the household who contributed the largest share of lifetime household earnings.  For those not retired, we use the 
expected retirement date of the person who is expected to contribute the largest share of lifetime household earnings. 
14 To simplify notation, age j variables will be expressed without any subscripts or superscripts, and age  1 j −  
variables and age 1 j +  variables will be represented with subscript “ 1 − ” and superscript “'”, respectively.   11
subject to 
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In equation (2),  ( , , , , ,3) RR Ve E ajm  denotes the present discounted value of utility from age  j  
until the date of death,  ( , , , 1, ,3) RR Ve E a j m ′′ +  denotes the corresponding value in the following 
year; β  is the discount factor on future utilities; and, as noted before,  hj p  and  wj p  denote the 
probability of survival between ages  j  and  1 j +  for the husband and the wife respectively.  
Medical expenses are drawn from the Markov processes  (| ) jm mm ′ Ω  and  (| ) js mm ′ Ω .  These 
distributions are allowed to be different depending upon whether the household is married (m) or 
single (s).  Total earnings up to the current period are denoted by  R E , while the last earnings 
draw at the age of retirement is  R e .  Note that  R E  and  R e  do not change once the individual is 
retired.  The integers in the last argument of the value function signify that only the husband 
survives (1), only the wife survives (2), or both the husband and wife are alive (3) at the 
beginning of the period.  
II.2.2.  The Problem at the Age of Retirement 
 
 Age  R  represents the last working age for the individual. At this age, the individual knows 
that in the next period he or she will cease working and begin receiving income from social 
security and defined benefit pensions.  The corresponding dynamic programming problem for a 
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The last earnings draw is  R e.   This draw will determine the household’s defined benefit pension 
receipts in retirement.  Further, this earnings draw together with total earnings to date,  1 R E − , 
determine total lifetime earnings, R E , which in turn determines social security benefits.  In 
addition, the household realizes that they will start receiving medical shocks beginning in the 
next period from the distribution 
* () Rm m′ Ω  or 
* () Rs m′ Ω , depending on whether both spouses, or 
just one, survive into the next period.
15 These distributions are assumed to be the stationary 
distributions associated with the corresponding Markov chains.   
II.2.3.  The Working Household’s Problem 
  To simplify computation, the dynamic programming problem for working households has 
two fewer state variables than it does for households beginning at the retirement age.  
Specifically, we assume households incur no out-of-pocket medical expenses prior to retirement 
and face no preretirement mortality risk.  Between ages S andR , the individual receives an 
                                                 
15 Medical expenses drawn from the distribution for single households are half those drawn from the distribution for 
married couples.   13
exogenous earnings draw e.  Given earnings and savings from the previous period, the 
individual decides how much to consume and save.  The decision problem reads 
  () () 1 , (, ,,) m a x / ( , ) ( , , , 1 ) , jj j ca
e
VeE aj UcgA K VeEa j d ee β − ′
′
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Note that during working years, earnings draws for the next period come from the distribution Φ 
conditional on the individual’s age and current earnings draw.  The solution to this problem 
yields the decision rule as a function of the individual state:  denote this decision rule 
1 (, ,,) aG e Ea j − ′ = . We assume that each household begins life with zero assets.  Given the 
observed earnings history of a household, we compute the optimal level of assets at every age 
using the decision rules. 
III.  Model Parameterization and Estimation of Exogenous Processes 
 
  In this section we specify functional forms and parameter values that we use to solve the 
model.  
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Following Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995); Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999); and Davis, 
Kubler, and Willen (2002), the discount factor is set as  0.97 β = , and the coefficient of relative  
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risk aversion (the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution) is set as  3. γ =   We 
describe sensitivity analyses on these key parameters below. 
 Equivalence  Scale: This is obtained from Citro and Michael (1995) and takes the form 
0.7 (, )( 0 . 7) jj j j gA K A K =+ , where again,  j A  ( j K ) indicates the number of adults (children) in 
the household. 
 Survival  Probabilities: These are based on the 1992 life tables of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/lifetables/life92_2.pdf). 
  Rate of Return:  We assume an annualized real rate of return of 4 percent.  This assumption 
is consistent with McGrattan and Prescott (2003), who find that the real rate of return for both 
equity and debt in the United States over the last 100 years, after accounting for taxes on 
dividends and diversification costs, is about 4 percent.
16  We include sensitivity analysis on this 
parameter below. 
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where y is in thousands of dollars.  Parameters are estimated by Gouveia and Strauss (1994, 
1999), and characterize U.S. effective, average household income taxes between 1966 and 
                                                 
16 Four percent is also the average (rounded to the nearest percentage point) of the average real stock market return 
between 1947 and 1996 (7.6 percent) and the average real return on 3-month Treasury bills (0.8 percent).     15
1989.
17   We use the 1966 parameters for years before 1966 and the 1989 parameters for 1990 
and 1991. 
 Transfers:  We model the cumulative benefits from public income transfer programs using a 
specification suggested by Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995).  Specifically, the transfer that an 
individual receives while working is given by 
[ ] { } max 0, (1 ) , Tc e r a =− + +  
 
whereas the transfer that he or she will receive upon retiring is 
 
  [ ] { } max 0, ( ) ( ) (1 ) . RR Tc S S E D B e r a =− + + +  
 
This transfer function guarantees a pre-tax income of c, which we set based on parameters 
drawn from Moffitt (2002).
18  Subsistence benefits (c) for a one-parent family with two children 
increased sharply, from $5,992 in 1968 to $9,887 in 1974 (all in 1992 dollars).  Benefits have 
trended down from their 1974 peak – in 1992 the consumption floor was $8,159 for the one-
parent, two-child family.  We assume through this formulation that earnings, retirement income, 
and assets reduce public benefits dollar for dollar.   
  Social Security and Defined Benefit Functions:  By making use of the social security 
earnings records, we calculate a close approximation of each household’s social security 
entitlement.  Households in the model understand social security rules and develop expectations 
                                                 
17 Estimated parameters, for example, in 1989 are  0 0.258 a = ,  1 0.768 a =  and  2 0.031 a = .  In the 
framework, 1 1 a =−  corresponds to a lump sum tax with  02 () ya a τ = − , while when  1 0 a → , the tax system 
converges to a proportional tax system with  0 () ya y τ = . For  1 0 a >  we have a progressive tax system. 
18 Moffitt (2002, http://www.econ.jhu.edu/People/Moffitt/DataSets.html) provides a consistent series for average 
benefits received by a family of four.  We use his “modified real benefit sum” variable, which roughly accounts for 
the cash value of food stamp, AFDC, and Medicaid guarantees.  We weight state-level benefits by population to 
calculate an average national income floor.  We use 1960 values for years prior to 1960 and use the equivalence 
scale described above to adjust benefits for families with different configurations of adults and children.  We 
confirm that the equivalence scale adjustments closely match average benefit patterns for families with different  
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of social security benefits that are consistent with their earnings expectations.  Details concerning 
the social security calculations are given in the first section of Appendix II. 
  Defined benefit pension expectations are formed on the basis of an empirical pension 
function that depends in a nonlinear way on union status, years of service in the pension-covered 
job, and expectations about earnings in the last year of work.  We estimate the function with 
HRS data.  Details are given in the second section of Appendix II. 
  Earnings Process:   The basic unit of analysis for our life-cycle model is the household.  We 
aggregate individual earnings histories into household earnings histories.  Earnings expectations 
are a central influence on life-cycle consumption decisions, both directly and through their 
effects on expected pension and social security receipts.   




jj j j eA G E A G E u αβ β = +++ , 
1 , jj j uu ρ ε − = +  
where  j e  is the observed earnings of the household i at age j in 1992-dollars, 
i α  is the household 
specific constant, AGEj is age of the head of the household,  j u  is an AR(1) error term of the 
earnings equation, and  j ε  is a zero-mean i.i.d., normally distributed error term.  The estimated 
parameters are 
i α ,  1 β ,  2 β , ρ, and  ε σ . 
                                                                                                                                                             
numbers of adults and children using data from the Green Book (1983, pp. 259-260, 301-302; 1988, pp. 410-412, 
789).   17
  We divide households into six groups according to marital status, education, and number of 
earners in the household, giving us six sets of household-group-specific parameters.
19  Estimates 
(excluding the household-specific effect) are given in Appendix Table 4.
20 
  Estimates of the persistence parameters range from 0.58 for single households without 
college degrees to 0.76 for married households with two earners, in which the highest earner has 
at least a college degree.  The variance of earnings shocks ranges from 0.21 for single 
households without college degrees to 0.08 for married households with either one or two 
earners and in which the highest earner has at least a college degree.   
  We provide sensitivity analysis, setting the persistence parameter to 0.90 for all groups, 
below. 
  Out of Pocket Medical Expenses:  The specification for household medical expense profiles 
across retirement ages is given by 
   
2
01 2 , tt t t mA G E A G E u ββ β =+ + + 
    
2
1 ,~ ( 0 ,) , tt t t uu Nε ρ εε σ − =+  
where mt is the log of the household's out-of-pocket medical expenses at time t (the medical 
expenses are assumed to be $1 if the self-report is zero or if the household has not yet retired), 
                                                 
19 The six groups are (1) single without a college degree; (2) single with a college degree or more; (3) married, head 
without a college degree, one earner; (4) married, head without a college degree, two earners; (5) married, head with 
a college degree, one earner; and (6) married, head with a college degree, two earners. A respondent is an earner if 
his or her lifetime earnings are positive and contribute at least 20 percent of the lifetime earnings of the household. 
20 Given the model assumption, predicted earnings are given by 
2( ) 2
12 ˆ exp( 2)
ij l
jj j l eA G E A G E u ε αβ β ρ σ
− =+ + ++  
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The household expected earnings profile is  ˆ {}
R
jj S e = , where S is the first year that the head of the household started 
working full time, R is the head’s last year of work.  The head of household is defined throughout the paper as the 
person in the household with the largest share of lifetime earnings.  
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AGEt is age of the household head at time t, ut is an AR(1) error term and εt is white-noise. The 
parameters to be estimated are β0, β1, β2, ρ, and σε.  
  We estimate the medical-expense specification for four groups of households: (1) single 
without a college degree, (2) single with a college degree, (3) married without a college degree, 
and (4) married with a college degree, using the 1998 and 2000 waves of the HRS.
21  We use the 
age and education of the head of household.  Results are given in the third section of Appendix 
II.  The persistence parameters for medical shocks cluster tightly at 0.87 for each group.  The 
variance of shocks is lower for households with greater education within a given household type 
(married or single), presumably reflecting higher rates of insurance coverage for households with 
college degrees relative to others. 
  To facilitate exposition, we denote the distribution from which a retired individual will draw 
next period's (age 1 j + ) medical expensesm′, conditional on the current earnings draw being m  
at age j , by () js mm ′ Ω  for single households and  ( ) jm mm ′ Ω  for married households. 
III.1.  Model Solution 
  We solve the dynamic programming problem by linear interpolation on the value function. 
Recall that the state space is composed of six variables for retired households: earnings drawn at 
j=R,  R e ; cumulative earnings at the time of retirement,  R E ; assets, a; age, i; medical expenses, m; 
and the number of household members alive, n (as noted earlier, we assume there are no 
mortality risks and out-of-pocket medical expenses for working households).  We begin by 
“discretizing” the state space. The 50-point grid for earnings is constructed using the procedure 
                                                 
21 New cohorts were added to the HRS in 1998, so the later years give us a broader range of ages to estimate age– 
medical expense profiles.  These new cohorts were not matched to their social security earnings records, so they 
cannot be used for our baseline analysis.   19
discussed in Tauchen (1986). The 100-point grid for assets is chosen to be denser at lower levels 
of assets and progressively coarser so as to account for nonlinearities in the decision rules for 
assets induced by the borrowing constraint. We start at age D, assumed to be 100, and compute 
the value function  ( , , , , , ) RR Ve E aDmn associated with all possible states in the discretized set. 
(The problem at this stage is trivial, since the individual will simply consume all income.) We 
move backward to the previous period and solve for the value function and the decision rule for 
assets. If optimal assets do not lie on the grid, we linearly interpolate between the points on the 
grid that lie on either side. In this fashion we go all the way to the starting age S and 
consequently recover the decision rules  1 (, ,,) aG e Ea j − ′ =  for all  ... j SR =  and 
1 (, ,,, ,) aG e Ea j m n − ′ =  for all  1... j RD =+ . 
  To summarize, for each household in our sample we compute optimal decision rules for 
consumption (and hence asset accumulation) from the oldest possible age (D) to the beginning 
of their working life (S ) for any feasible realizations of the random variables:  earnings, health 
shocks, and mortality.  These decision rules differ for each household, since each faces stochastic 
draws from different earnings distributions (recall that  i α  is household-specific).  Household-
specific earnings expectations also directly influence expectations about social security and 
pension benefits.  Other characteristics also differ across households:  for example, birth years of 
children affect the “adult equivalents” in a household at any given age.  Consequently, it is not 
sufficient to solve the life-cycle problem for just a few household types. 
  Once optimal decision rules are solved for each household, we calculate optimal 
consumption (and therefore wealth) each period for each household using data on the observed 
realizations of earnings.  Specifically, we start at age S, the first working age, where the  
  20
household is assumed to begin with zero assets. Earnings to date are also zero at S.  Given 
observed earnings at age S,  ˆS e , wealth (saving) is given by  1 ˆ ( ,0,0, ) SS aG e S + = . In the next 
period, the household receives an observed earnings draw 1 ˆS e + , so aggregate earnings are given 
by ˆ ˆ SS Ee = .  Consequently, wealth is given by  11 ˆ ˆ (, , ,1 ) . SS S S aG e E a S ++ = +   We move forward in 
this fashion until we reach the age at which wealth data are available for that particular 
household. 
  The model, for the sample of 6,322 households, takes roughly six days to solve on a current 
desktop PC.  Computational constraints, therefore, limit our ability to add features to the model 
or estimate the fit-maximizing discount rate or coefficient of relative risk aversion.   
IV.  Model Predictions and Their Correspondence to HRS Data 
 
  In this section we compare the optimal wealth levels for each household to their actual 
wealth holdings.  We start by providing information on optimal wealth for HRS households as 
specified by our augmented life-cycle model.  We then present detailed information on the 
degree to which HRS households are meeting their specific targets.  The third subsection 
examines correlations between household characteristics and the degree to which households are 
and are not meeting their targets.  We then compare our results to wealth predictions that would 
arise from a naïve behavioral model, where households save an age-varying and income-varying 
fraction of their annual earnings, and show our model significantly outperforms several 
alternatives.  We also show that the model matches other features of wealth and consumption 
data.  The section concludes with sensitivity analyses on key model parameters.   21
IV.1   Optimal Wealth Accumulation in the HRS 
  Table 2 summarizes the distribution of optimal net worth holdings.  These targets include 
resources that could be accumulated in real and financial assets, the current value of defined 
contribution pensions, including 401(k)s, and housing net worth (for now, we assume households 
are willing to reduce housing in retirement to maintain consumption standards).  Recall that the 
mean age of households in our sample is 55.7, so the average household will work many 
additional years before retiring.   
  As in the results of Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995), low-skilled households will 
optimally accumulate negligible amounts of wealth outside of social security.  The optimal 
wealth target for the median households in the lowest decile of the lifetime income distribution is 
$2,941 (including housing wealth).  Means-tested transfer programs, including AFDC (during 
the period being studied), food stamps, SSI, and other forms of assistance, have income and asset 
tests.  Households that receive transfers or that might receive transfers in the future may 
optimally accumulate fewer assets than they would in the absence of a safety net, since assets 
above a threshold will make households ineligible for benefits.
22   
  Optimal wealth targets are $69,777 for the median household and are $253,631 for the 
median household in the highest decile of the lifetime income distribution.
23  The targets increase 
monotonically with lifetime income and with educational attainment. 
                                                 
22 Empirical work on the effects of asset tests and asset accumulation comes to mixed conclusions.  Gruber and 
Yelowitz (1999) find significant negative effects of Medicaid on asset accumulation, but Hurst and Ziliak (2001) 
find only very small effects of AFDC and food stamp asset limits. 
23 In other studies, wealth targets are commonly given in the form of wealth-to-earnings ratios.  In the second 
column of Table 2 we show targets as a ratio of average income earned in the last five years that the household 
worked in the 1992 HRS.  Optimal wealth-to-earnings ratios are 2.4 at the median, and median ratios range from 1.2 
to 4.0 across the educational attainment distribution and from 0.6 to 3.9 across deciles of the lifetime income 
distribution.  
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  A central feature of our work that distinguishes it from earlier papers is that we can compare 
optimal levels of wealth with actual wealth for each household in the HRS.  
IV.2.  Are Households Preparing Optimally for Retirement? 
  Figure 2 gives a scatterplot of optimal net worth against actual net worth, for HRS 
households with optimal and actual wealth between $0 and $1,000,000.  The curved line gives a 
cubic spline of the median values of observed and optimal net worth.
24  The figure is striking, in 
that households appear to cluster just below the 45° line.  The scatterplot gives suggestive visual 
evidence that most households are saving adequately for retirement. 
  A second striking aspect of Figure 2 is that it illustrates how a well-specified life-cycle 
model can closely account for variation in cross-sectional household wealth accumulation.  A 
linear regression of actual net worth against predicted net worth and a constant shows the model 
explains 84 percent of the cross-household variation in wealth (that is, the R
2 is 84 percent).
25 
  Table 3 shows the fraction of HRS households with wealth deficits, broken out by 
educational attainment and lifetime earnings deciles.  Overall, 18.6 percent of the HRS sample 
has deficits (their wealth is less than the optimal target).  However, the median magnitude 
(conditional on having a deficit) is very small, averaging $5,714.  Although some households are 
approaching retirement with significant wealth deficits, Table 3 provides additional evidence that 
HRS households overwhelmingly are well prepared for retirement.   
                                                 
24 The median band is smoothed by dividing households into 30 groups based on observed net worth.  We use 
Stata’s “connect(s) bands(30)” option for the figure. 
25 Hurst (2003), using an innovative test from the PSID, shows that between 10 and 20 percent of the population 
appears not to be following the permanent income hypothesis.  In brief, he splits the sample into low-residual 
undersavers (the bottom 10–20 percent of wealth residuals) and other households based on a log-wealth regression 
estimated from the 1989 wealth supplement of the PSID.  He then shows that undersavers violate Euler equation 
excess sensitivity tests, whereas other households do not.     23
  The last four columns of Table 3 help put the magnitude of the wealth deficits in 
perspective.  Column 3 repeats the optimal net worth targets shown in Table 2.  Comparing 
columns 2 and 3, median deficits for households who have deficits are generally small relative to 
the optimal targets.  The remaining columns show the actual nonpension, non-social-security net 
worth accumulated by households, their social security entitlements, and their defined benefit 
pension entitlements.  Reinforcing the impression from Figure 2, Table 3 shows that households 
accumulate more than the optimal level of net worth throughout the education and lifetime 
income distribution.   
  Another striking feature of Table 3 is that the probability of failing to meet the target is 34.6 
percent in the lowest lifetime income decile and falls monotonically to 6.4 percent in the highest 
lifetime income decile.  The simple cross-tabulation suggests that to the extent undersaving is a 
problem, it is particularly acute for low-income households.  In this case, however, the 
descriptive statistics are misleading. 
  Table 4 shows the results from a probit regression of the probability that an HRS household 
failed to meet its optimal wealth target.  It is striking that lifetime income does not have a strong, 
statistically significant effect once we condition on other covariates.
26  The only factor that is 
strongly correlated with having a wealth deficit is being single – married households are 27.2 
percentage points less likely to have a deficit than single households.   
  In additional regressions estimated separately for a sample of single households and for a 
sample of married households, no covariates are correlated with saving less than the optimal 
target for single households.  The only covariate correlated with a wealth deficit for married 
couples is an indicator variable for Hispanic ethnicity.  Hispanic couples are 2.8 percentage  
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points less likely than white couples to have deficits.  These results suggest undersaving is 
approximately randomly distributed throughout the population – it is not a phenomenon 
disproportionately affecting poor households or households with low levels of education.  
Moreover, the strong income gradient shown in Table 3 is purely a composition effect – single 
households are much more likely than married households not to meet their wealth targets.  Since 
single households are more likely to have lower incomes than married households, they are 
disproportionately represented in the lower deciles of the lifetime earnings distribution.
27 
IV.3.  Are Americans Oversaving?  
  To this point we have only presented figures for the median household in the population or 






th – of the distribution of the difference between actual 
and optimal wealth targets by lifetime income deciles.  Two things are striking from this figure.  
First, only very small percentages of households accumulated less than their optimal wealth 
target.  Undersavers are concentrated in the bottom half of the lifetime income distribution.  And 
the magnitudes of the shortfalls, conditional on having a shortfall, are small.  Second, the most 
striking aspect of Figure 3 is the degree to which people are saving too much.  We probe this 
result in the remaining part of this subsection.   
                                                                                                                                                             
26 The income coefficients are not jointly significant at even the 15 percent level of confidence, nor are the 
coefficients for the highest three lifetime income deciles. 
27 We were also concerned that the results for singles could be driven by divorce.  If one-earner, married households 
divorced prior to the HRS survey, we would likely treat single earner as undersaving (they had income that before 
was supporting a family, yet following the divorce they would be expected to have only half the assets).  Similarly, 
the nonworking partners would appear to have oversaved – they earned no income but are observed to have half the 
previously accumulated assets.  However, this concern appears to be misplaced:  the fraction of singles failing to 
meet their wealth targets is stable as we drop recently divorced individuals from the sample, or when we drop ever-
divorced individuals.   25
  There is some question about the degree to which the elderly are willing to reduce housing 
equity to sustain consumption in retirement.  Venti and Wise (2001), for example, write “these 
results suggest that in considering whether families have saved enough to maintain their 
preretirement standard of living after retirement, housing equity should not be counted on to 
support general non-housing consumption.”  This conclusion is controversial.  Hurd (2003) 
shows that the elderly households in the AHEAD data (the Study of Assets and Health Dynamics 
Among the Oldest Old) decumulate housing wealth as they age.  Engen, Gale, and Uccello 
(1999) make a forceful case for including at least a significant portion of housing wealth when 
measuring resources households can draw on to maintain living standards in retirement.
28  
Nevertheless, we do not want the first conclusion from Figure 3 – that a substantial majority of 
Americans are preparing well for retirement – to be driven by our treatment of home equity. 
  To explore the consequences of altering the treatment of housing in our calculations, we 
also examine the distribution of wealth deficits excluding half of housing from the resources 
available to meet the wealth target.  Excluding half of housing equity, 57.9 percent of all 
households meet or exceed their wealth targets.  The 25
th percentile of the saving surplus 
distribution (net worth minus optimal targets) has a deficit of $10,296, implying that 75 percent 
of households are exceeding or within $10,300 of their optimal (nonpension, non-social-security) 
wealth target, even excluding half their net home equity.  The lowest decile of the distribution 
has a deficit of $40,371.  The full distribution is given in Figure 4.  Whereas results in the paper 
                                                 
28 Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999) make four points.  First, existing work suggesting the elderly do not decumulate 
is flawed; housing should be the last asset to tap since it is illiquid and tax-preferred, and because some evidence is 
based on cohorts that were considerably less mobile than the HRS cohort.  Second, households have vigorously 
extracted equity from houses in the 1980s and 1990s.  Third, tax consequences of selling housing have fallen in 
recent years making it difficult to make inferences about people’s willingness to downsize from earlier data.  Fourth, 
housing provides consumption services and thus represents wealth.  Conceptually and from a policy perspective, it 
seems odd to ignore one important source of wealth when considering economic well-being among households in 
retirement.  
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are qualitatively similar if we exclude half of housing equity, we report results when using all net 
worth for the remainder of the paper. 
  There are at least three features of the model that could account for the fact that many 
households appear to be accumulating significantly more than their optimal life-cycle targets.
29  
First, we assume households expected and received a real rate of return of 4 percent.  To the 
extent perceptions or realizations of real rates of return differ from our assumption, households 
will accumulate less or more than the target.  One way to probe the importance of this factor is to 
make use of the limited geographic information available in the HRS.
30  House prices on the East 
and West Coasts increased substantially more over this period than house prices elsewhere.
31  If 
rate of return assumptions are systematically accounting for oversaving, we expect that 
households living in the New England Division (MA, NH, VT, MA, RI, and CN) or the Pacific 
Division (WA, OR, CA, AK, and HI) will be more likely than other households to significantly 
exceed their targets. 
  Second, households may intend to leave bequests.  Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2003), for 
example, argue that bequest intentions are the best way to reconcile wealth-income patterns in 
several nationally representative datasets.  We use HRS questions probing the subjective 
likelihood of households leaving bequests of $10,000 and $100,000 to explore whether 
                                                 
29 A fourth would be that our chosen preference parameters are incorrect.  We explore the model sensitivity to 
preference parameters in a later subsection. 
30 HRS rules prohibit using restricted-access geocoded data with the restricted-access earnings data.  Given the 
centrality of the earnings data to this project, we can only use the publicly available geographic information, which 
breaks the United States into nine regions. 
31 The repeat-sales house price index increased 381 percent between 1975 and 1992 in the Pacific, 278 percent in 
New England, and less than 120 percent in the East South Central, West South Central, and West North Central 
Divisions.   See http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/ushmc/fall02/histdat10.htm.   27
households with a high (or certain) likelihood of leaving a bequest of these magnitudes are more 
likely than other households to exceed their wealth targets.
32 
  Third, households might expect to live longer than suggested by the life tables published by 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  Households with expectations of greater 
longevity will optimally accumulate more resources than predicted by our model.  We use HRS 
questions probing subjective expectations of life expectancy to explore the importance of this 
factor in explaining oversaving.
33   
  We examine the importance of rate of return differences, bequest intentions, and longevity 
risk along with factors in an empirical median regression model of “saving adequacy,” defined as 
the difference between actual net worth (excluding DB pensions and social security wealth) and 
optimal net worth.  The results are shown in Table 5.  There is a sharply increasing, positive 
relationship between wealth accumulation and lifetime income starting in the sixth lifetime 
income decile.  There is also a strong positive relationship between net worth and social security 
wealth and being self-employed and married.  Households headed by men and black households 
have lower wealth than white, female-headed households.  Saving adequacy also declines with 
the number of children in the family.  There is no evidence that region of the country or 
subjective life expectancies have any relationship with saving adequacy (or oversaving).  
Bequest intentions, however, are positively, significantly related to acquiring more wealth than 
the optimal target.  This result is consistent with purposeful bequest intentions affecting life-
cycle wealth accumulation. 
                                                 
32 The specific questions come from the 1994 wave of the HRS and read, “What are the chances that you [or your 
husband/wife/partner] will leave an inheritance totaling $10,000 (or $100,000) or more? 
33 The specific questions come from the 1992 wave of the HRS and read, “What do you think are the chances that 
you will live to be 75 (or 85) or more?”  
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IV.4.  Alternative, “Naïve” Models  
In the conclusion of their paper on variation in retirement wealth, Bernheim, Skinner, and 
Weinberg (2001) write, “the empirical patterns in this paper are more easily explained if one 
steps outside the framework of rational, far-sighted optimization.  If, for example, households 
follow heuristic rules of thumb to determine saving prior to retirement….”  Indeed, naïve or rule-
of-thumb models of consumption have had an important place in the consumption literature at 
least since the Keynesian consumption function.   
The exceptionally rich data we have on household earnings contain a great deal of 
information.  Health shocks prior to retirement, unemployment, changes in labor demand and 
supply, among other things, will be reflected in the 41-year series of earnings we have for most 
households.  Given the rich earnings data, it is natural to ask how much of the variation in HRS 
wealth can be explained by applying simple, rule-of-thumb saving behavior to the household-
specific earnings trajectories.  In doing this analysis, we continue to assume a 4 percent real 
interest rate, as we have done in the baseline life-cycle simulations.  Our results are summarized 
in Table 6. 
The simplest model we examined assumes that households save a constant fraction of their 
income, independent of their income or age.  We iteratively sought the saving rate that 
maximized the goodness of fit measure, R
2.  The fit-maximizing saving rate is 6.9 percent and 
the model explains 7.1 percent of the 1992 cross-sectional distribution of wealth in the HRS.  A 
naïve model with age-varying and income-varying saving rates, in this case drawn from the 
parameters estimated in Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2003, Table 3), explains 11.4 percent of the 
variation in retirement wealth.  The original formulation of the life-cycle model (Modigliani and   29
Brumberg, 1954) where households save a constant fraction of permanent income (in this case, 
5.8 percent) explains 16.1 percent of the variation in retirement wealth.  It is clear that the 
augmented life-cycle model presented in this paper, which explains 83.7 percent of the cross-
sectional variation in wealth, does a vastly better job matching the cross-sectional distribution of 
wealth in the 1992 HRS than the rule-of-thumb models we examine. 
Our augmented life-cycle model includes many more parameters than the rule-of-thumb 
models.  With more parameters, model fit should improve.  Our augmented life-cycle model has 
a household-specific intercept,  i α , of the household age-earnings profiles, in effect adding 6,322 
parameters to the model.  We think this is a sensible way to model earning expectations – 
households presumably have a reasonable understanding of their place in the ability distribution, 
given observable characteristics such as educational attainment and age.  Nevertheless, we also 
consider an alternative, more parsimonious version of the baseline model in which we assume 
that all households possess identical  's α .  To do this we re-estimate the AR(1) process 
(assuming identical  's α  within household types) and simulate the optimal decision rules.  We 
find that the model can account for 43.6 percent of the observed variation in 1992 wealth.  Thus, 
our model, even with relatively few parameters, does a fairly good job matching the 1992 cross-
sectional distribution of wealth in the HRS.  
Anther useful benchmark for our augmented life-cycle model is to compare its model fit to 
reduced-form regression models.  We regress wealth in 1992 against earnings and a host of other 
household characteristics, in which each of the 41 years of earnings observations appear 
separately.
34  This regression accounts for 25.3 percent of the variation in wealth.  If we add 
                                                 
34 The model also includes a quadratic in age, indicator variables for race and ethnicity, marital status, educational 
attainment, region, 17 occupations, 13 industries, two-earner household, retired, self-employment, unemployment,  
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quadratic terms in each year of earnings the resulting empirical model accounts for 29.7 percent 
of the variation in wealth.  Even a parsimonious parameterization of the augmented life-cycle 
model that includes fewer parameters does a better job of explaining the observed variation in 
wealth than a regression that incorporates separately the linear and quadratic terms of annual 
earnings.  
Our last experiment with alternative models attempts to clarify the importance of the 
augmented life-cycle model’s decision rules in explaining the model fit, relative to the unusually 
rich earnings histories we use.  To examine this, consider the following thought experiment. 
Once we solve the model for each individual, we have the optimal decision rules. Now, rather 
than using the actual earnings draws to obtain wealth predictions for 1992, imagine that we were 
to obtain, for each individual, 10,000 (sequences of) draws from the empirical earnings 
distribution and then use these draws to obtain predictions for wealth in 1992. The predicted 
wealth level for each individual is the average value implied by the potential realization of all 
such sequences. One can do the same for all the individuals in the sample and obtain the 
goodness of fit between the model and the data. The resulting R
2 is 41.1 percent. This suggests 
that although it is important to have the earnings realizations, the decision rules arising from the 
augmented life-cycle model are equally critical in arriving at such a close correspondence 
between model and data.  
IV.5.  Other Model Features 
In this section we briefly examine three other features of the baseline model and show that 
they are consistent with several well-established facts about consumption.  First, a well-known 
                                                                                                                                                             
health status, pension coverage, past marital history, and counts of the number of children, number of children 
between 12 and 17, and the number of children between 18 and 21.   31
fact from the consumption literature is that consumption is hump-shaped over the lifecycle (see, 
for example, Carroll, 1997).  Figure 5 reports mean optimal consumption and income by age for 
our sample after we have netted out children’s consumption so as to keep family size constant.  
Consumption is hump-shaped and peaks around age 46, whereas the peak in income occurs 
around age 51.  The patterns in Figure 5 mirror those reported in Gourinchas and Parker 
(2002).
35   
A second issue has to do with how our augmented life-cycle model can match the well-
known skewness of the wealth distribution.  Our model predicts that the top 1 percent of our 
sample holds about 17 percent of the wealth.  The corresponding figure in the data is 24 percent.   
So, just as is often claimed, the lack of bequest motives undermines the ability of the model to 
match the wealth holdings of the very rich.  But the model does capture a large part of the 
skewness. 
Third, a more stringent test of our model is how well it can match the change in wealth 
between 1992 and 2000. To put this in context, it is instructive to compare our model fit with a 
regression of the difference in wealth levels between 1992 and 2000 against household 
characteristics and earnings at every age.
36 The resulting R
2 is 3.6 percent.  Introducing a 
quadratic term for earnings (at each age) increases the R
2 to 6.6 percent.  In contrast, the baseline 
model (with a 4 percent real interest rate between 1992 and 2000) generates an R
2 of 28 percent. 
                                                 
35 Prior to age 45 households in the model engage in “buffer stock” saving (Carroll, 2001).  Carroll argues that a 
version of the life-cycle model where ()
1
(1 ) 1.0029 rg γ β +=< , where g represents that growth rate of income does 
a very good job of capturing consumption-saving behavior during working ages.  Our baseline parameters satisfy 
this condition.  Setting 1 β = , for example, leads to households beginning retirement wealth accumulation earlier in 
life and a monotonically increasing age-consumption profile during working years. 
36 The regression model also includes the covariates listed in footnote 34.  
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We conclude that the model presented does a good job of capturing observed behavior, not just 
of a cross-section at a point in time, but also changes over time across households.  
IV.6.  Sensitivity Analysis  
There are three model parameters that we specify exogenously before solving the model – the 
discount factor (β ), the coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ ), and the real interest rate (r ).  
In this subsection we analyze the sensitivity of the results to our choices of  ,  β γ , and r .  Table 
7 shows the results.  As expected, increases in β  and r  increase the incentive to save more in 
the future.  In the life-cycle model this raises the optimal (or “target”) level of wealth.  When 
these targets are matched to the observed HRS data, more households fail to save adequately for 
retirement.  For example, raising the real interest rate from 4 percent to 7 percent increases the 
fraction of households with wealth less than the optimal from 18.6 percent to 38.9 percent.  An 
increase in γ  has a similar effect because, as households become more risk averse, precautionary 
saving increases, increasing the optimal (or target) level of wealth accumulation and 
consequently undersaving.  Nevertheless, the degree of undersaving is not particularly high – 
assuming that 5 γ = , for example, increases the fraction of households with wealth less than the 
optimal from 18.6 percent to 35.7 percent in the baseline results.  
Another parameter that plays an important role is the persistence in earnings across ages. 
Recall that these persistence parameters vary by type; they range from 0.58 for the single 
household without a college degree to 0.76 for the married, two-earner household, in which the 
head has a college degree.  These parameters were estimated directly from the 41 years of Social 
Security earnings data.  But many life-cycle models assume more persistence in the earnings 
process.  The last line of Table 7 arbitrarily sets all persistence parameters in earnings   33
expectations to 0.9.  Households understand that this dramatically increases the odds of retaining 
a bad or good draw if one is received. The resulting R
2 is 68.9 percent, and 27.6 percent of 
households fail to meet their optimal targets.  As expected, increasing the persistence in earnings 
increases optimal wealth accumulation at retirement.  
Our sensitivity analysis leads us to conclude that within the range of values considered, most 
households in the HRS appear to have saved adequately for retirement.
37  Moreover, within a 
reasonably broad range of parameter values, the model can explain at least 68.9 percent of the 
cross-sectional variation in wealth in the 1992 HRS.  These results do not depend at all on the 
inclusion of households in the sample with fully imputed earnings histories.  When we drop 
households that did not allow the HRS to have access to their social security earnings records,  
the results are nearly identical using our baseline parameters:  18.4 percent of households 
accumulate less wealth than their optimal targets.  Conditional on having a deficit, the median 
shortfall is $5,028.  And the model accounts for 84 percent of the cross-sectional distribution of 
wealth in this subsample. 
V.  Conclusions 
  In this paper we develop a rigorous approach for assessing the degree to which a 
representative sample of households nearing retirement have prepared financially for that event.  
We find strikingly little evidence that HRS households have undersaved.  And because 
consumption requirements likely fall when households reach retirement (if for no other reason 
than work expenses fall), our standard may overstate required wealth.  We also note that our 
primary data come from 1992, well before the exceptionally strong stock market performance of 
                                                 
37 If social security benefits are cut by 25 percent for all households, we find that 36.1 percent of households under-
save, almost twice as many as in the baseline model.  But we think such benefit cuts are unlikely for the HRS cohort. 
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the 1990s.  Because 81 percent of households meet or exceed their wealth targets (and most of 
those who are below miss by a relatively small amount), we are skeptical that the consumption 
changes around retirement documented by Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001) are due to 
inadequate retirement wealth accumulation. 
  We also find it striking how much of the variation in observed wealth accumulation can be 
explained by our life-cycle model.  We explain over 85 percent of the variation in wealth for 
married households, and over 70 percent for single, never-married households.  And the results 
presented reflect no tweaking or prior fitting of the model.  If we had found major deviations 
from the model and behavior, it would be difficult to determine whether Americans were 
preparing poorly for retirement, or we had constructed a poor behavioral benchmark.  The fact 
that our predictions and data closely align suggests two things.  First, as mentioned above, 
Americans are saving enough to maintain living standards in retirement.  And second, the life-
cycle model provides a very good representation of behavior related to the accumulation of 
retirement wealth.  Of course, we still admit the possibility that Americans are preparing poorly 
for retirement, our underlying behavioral model is poor, and the errors, coincidentally, offset. 
  Although the specific measures of undersaving and model fit clearly depend on parameter 
values, our two main results – that the life-cycle model is capable of closely matching the cross-
sectional distribution of wealth in the HRS and that most HRS households are saving more than 
their optimal targets – are not affected significantly by parameter choices that are within the 
range commonly found in the related literature.  We also find the life-cycle model does a much 
better job of matching the cross-sectional distribution of wealth in 1992 than a naïve model in 
which households save an income- and age-varying fraction of income.   35
  Turning to the question posed in the title of the paper:  are Americans saving optimally for 
retirement?  The HRS covers a specific cohort of Americans – households age 51 to 61 in 1992.  
Consequently, we need to be careful in generalizing our results for the HRS cohort to younger 
households.  This is particularly true if the generosity of social security is reduced in the future.  
Moreover, saving too much has efficiency costs in the sense that, absent preferences about 
intergenerational transfers or charitable contributions, reallocating consumption across time 
could increase lifetime utility.  Because we cannot determine whether the systematic oversaving 
of HRS households reflects bequest motives, the expectation that social security will be reduced 
in the future, other failures in our characterization of the economic environment, or reflects 
nonoptimal behavior on the part of HRS households, we cannot definitively answer the question 
posed in the paper title.  But the paper provides new, strong support for the life-cycle model as a 
good characterization of the process governing retirement wealth accumulation.  And more 
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Appendix I:  Imputing Earnings in the HRS 
We have two problems that we address with the earnings data. For 77 percent of the 1992 
HRS sample, we have access to each individual’s social security earnings records from 1951 to 
1991.  The social security earning records report wage, salary, and self-employment income up 
to the earnings maximum (the earnings thresholds at which social security taxes are no longer 
taken from income). For 92 percent of the respondents with Social Security earnings records, we 
also have W-2 earnings records from 1980 to 1991. These W-2 records provide complete 
earnings information for wage and salary earners and the self-employed. The first difficulty is 
that 16 percent of positive social security earnings records are top-coded, and 41 percent of 
respondents with social security earnings records have at least one top-coded observation. 
Our second problem is that 23 percent of observations refused to grant access to social 
security earnings records.  For these households we have self-reported earnings information for 
their current job (or the most recent job if not employed) and as many as three previous jobs.  We 
need to estimate their earning profiles based on their self-reported earnings information. 
The goal is to use all available information to impute top-coded and missing earning 
observations, and as a result obtain complete individual earnings histories. For the imputation, 
we proceed in two steps. First, based on the social security and W-2 records, we estimate a 
dynamic-panel Tobit model to obtain individual earning processes. Then, conditional on all 




We start by describing our approach to estimating earnings for individuals with top-coded 
earnings.   
For simplicity, suppose that we have earnings records of N individuals from time t = 0 to T, 
where 0 is the first period that these individuals started working full time. Assume for the 
moment that earnings are positive in each time period.
38 Denote the logarithmic value of 
individual i's actual (latent) and observed (by the researcher) earnings as 
*
,t i y  and yi,t, 
respectively. The relationship between the observed and actual (latent) earnings can be described 
as 
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t y  is the logarithmic value of the social security maximum taxable earnings at time t. 
The individual log-earnings process is specified as 
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38 Generalizing this to the case in which the earnings series begins after time 0 and the case in which some earnings 
observations are zero is straightforward but detail-oriented, so we omit the discussion. We did treat these cases in 
practice, however.  
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where xi,t  is the vector of i's characteristics at time t, and the error term εi,t  includes an 
individual-specific component  i α , which is constant over time and known to the individual 
before time 0, and the unanticipated white noise component, ui,t . Notice that parameters β0 and β 
are allowed to be different. In the following analysis, we employ random-effect assumptions 
with homoskedastic errors 
(A1)   ) , 0 ( ~ |
2
α σ α N iid xi i  
(A2)   t N iid x u u i t i ∀ ) , 0 ( ~ |
2
, σ  
(A3)  k t T t x u u E x u E x u E i i k i t i u i i t i i i t i ≠ ∈ ∀ = = = }, ,.., 1 , 0 { , 0 ] , | [ , ] , | [ , 0 ] , | [ , ,
2 2
, , α σ α α  
where  ,0 ,1 , ( , ,..., ) i ii i T x xx x ≡ . 
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, α σ σ = k j  otherwise. Our goal here is to obtain consistent 




u σ σ ρ β β θ α = . We do this by maximum likelihood. 
To construct the likelihood function for each individual's earnings series, notice that we can 
write the joint distribution function of each pair of random variables  ) , (
*
, , t i t i y y  as 
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made in (6), it follows that  
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In other words, of all the information about past realized and observed earnings, only 
information from the previous period matters. As a special case, the conditional likelihood of the 
pair  ) , (
*
0 , 0 , i i y y  is  ) , | , (
*
0 , 0 , 0 θ i i i x y y g  because there is no information about earnings before 
period 0. 
Applying Bayes' rules to the density g( ), we have 
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where the density for the observed log-earnings conditional on the past information is a 
conventional Tobit likelihood function 
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where f( ) and Pr( ) are a probability density and a cumulative density function respectively, and 
the conditional density h( ) for noncensored observations is the probability mass function 
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and the conditional density is simply  ) , ; , , | (
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censored observations. In addition, the density for the time-0 observed log-earnings conditional 
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where c1, c2, ..., cn are the periods where the observed log-earnings are censored, i.e., equal to 
their corresponding top-coded limits. Notice that, since we do not observe 
*
,t i y  when it is 
censored, we integrate out 
*
,t i y  for censored observations. Unfortunately, the integration does not 
yield any analytical solution, nor is direct numerical evaluation of the integral computationally 
feasible in this case. As an alternative, Chang (2002) proposes using a GHK (probit) simulator to 
deal with the computational burden of the integration.




                                                 
39 The GHK simulator gives a numerical approximation of a probit probability of interest. The GHK simulator is a 
popular choice of probit simulators due to its relative accuracy; see Geweke, Keane, and Runkle (1994) for details.  
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***  Constant 




*** -0.013  Race (white = 1, 0 otherwise) 




*** 0.041  Years of Schooling / Professional Post-
Graduate Degree Dummy 




*** 0.122  No High School Dummy / Post-Graduate 
Degree Dummy 
§  (0.002) (0.034) (0.045) (0.088) 
0.113
*** 0.030  -0.034  0.108  Marital Status in 1992 HRS 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.128) 
-0.071 -0.087  0.175
*** 0.143  Two-Earner Household Dummy 





***  Age 





***  0.01 x Age
2 
(0.004) (0.033) (0.013) (0.042) 





***  Constant 




** -0.025  Race (white = 1, 0 otherwise) 





*  Years of Schooling / Professional 
Postgraduate Degree Dummy 




***  No High School Dummy / Post-Graduate 
Degree Dummy 





***  Marital Status in 1992 HRS 





***  Two-Earner Household Dummy 





**  Age 




*** -0.010  0.01 x Age
2 





***  Earnings at the Previous Period 





***  Variance of the Individual-Specific Effect (
2
α σ ) 





***  Variance of the Gross Error Term (
2
ε σ ) 
(0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.014) 
Number of Individual-Year Observations  92,889  21,479  48,625  8,747 
Number  of  Respondents  3,095 724 2,670 452 
§ The dependent variable is the respondents’ natural-log-earnings. For samples with at most high school, the education variables 
are (i) Years of Schooling, and (ii) No High School Dummy.  For samples with at least a bachelor’s degree, the education 
variables are (i) Professional Postgraduate Degree (MBA, J.D., M.D., or Ph.D.) Dummy, and (ii) Postgraduate Degree Dummy. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, 
**, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   43
 Imputation 
 
  The idea is to impute top-coded and missing earnings observations with their conditional 
expectations where the conditioning variables include both the individual’s characteristics and 
observed earnings. The conditional expectations are calculated numerically on the basis of the 
dynamic earnings model (6) and the distributional assumption (7). The imputation scheme is 
similar for top-coded and missing observations; therefore, we only discuss the scheme for top-
coded observations here.
40 
To be concrete, notice that (6) implies that 
     ] , , | [ ] , , | [ 0 0 0
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where  ) ,..., , ( 1 0 T y y y y =  is the series of individual i’s observed earnings (the individual subscript 
i is omitted throughout this subsection). By construction, given information about individual’s 
characteristics and observed earnings,  ] , , | [
* θ x y y E t  is on average the best guess for
*
t y . In other 
words, for top-coded observations, equation (6) suggests the imputed values 
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t t t =  for every period t in which 
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t t y y = . The 
analytical form of  ] , , ; | [ θ ε x y y y E
tc
t t t =  is not available in our case; therefore, we calculate this 
object numerically using the Gibbs sampling procedure.
41 
To facilitate the discussion about details of the procedure, denote  ) ,..., , ( 1 1 0 ′ = − < t t ε ε ε ε , 
) ,..., , ( 2 1 ′ = + + > T t t t ε ε ε ε  and  ) ,..., , ,..., , ( 1 1 1 0 ′ = + − − T t t t ε ε ε ε ε ε  for any vector  ) ,..., , ( 1 0 ′ = T ε ε ε ε . Here, 
we want to simulate R sets of ε  that are consistent with the observed y and x given θ. The Gibbs 
sampling procedure does this in 2 steps for each round of simulation. 
 
1. In the r
th round of simulation, r = 1,2, ... ,R, generate a “random” initial value 
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40 We can think of a missing earnings observation as an observation with top-coded value of 0, which is equivalent 
to saying that we know nothing about earnings in that period (as opposed to the case in which we observe top-coded 
earnings and know that the actual earnings is at least as large as the top-coded earnings). 
41 Briefly, Gibbs sampling is a procedure to draw a set of numbers randomly from a (valid) joint distribution. Then, 
the random draws are used to estimate properties of any marginal distribution of interest, which is difficult to derive 
analytically from the joint distribution. The procedure relies upon the law of large numbers, i.e., that moments of a 
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Given the estimate  ] , , | [ ˆ θ ε x y E t , we calculate the imputed value of earnings as 
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The remaining parts of this subsection (i) construct the functional form for the 




m t ε  from 
this conditional distribution to satisfy (6) given y, x and θ. More notation is required. For any 
matrix Σ, denote Σt,t as the element of Σ on the t
th row and t
th column,  t t − Σ ,  as the t
th row of Σ 
with the element Σt,t removed,  t t, − Σ  as the t
th column of Σ with the element Σt,t removed, and 
t t − − Σ ,  as the matrix Σ with the t
th row and t
th column removed. 
Recall the property of a joint-normal vector that 
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   ]} [ { ] [
1
, , | t t t t t t t t t E E − −
−
− − − − − Σ Σ + = ε ε ε µ ,  t t t t t t t t t t ,
1
, , , | −
−
− − − − Σ Σ Σ − Σ = Σ              (13)
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Recall from (7) that  0 ] [ = i E ε  and  1
2
1
2 1 ) 1 ( + + + − = Σ T T I ε ε ρσ σ ρ , where 1T+1 is a (T+1) x (T+1) 
matrix whose elements are all 1. Thus,  t t t t t t t −
−
− − − − Σ Σ = ε µ
1








− − − Σ Σ = Σ Σ s s s s t t t t  and 
s s t t − − Σ = Σ | |  for any t = 0, ..., T and s = 0, ..., T. 
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In practice, it is more convenient to work with the standard-normal transformation of  t t − ε ε |  
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   (15) 
                                                 
42 See, for example, Goldberger, 1991, pp. 196-97.   45
From (6),  0 0 0
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m t ξ  is a random draw from a [0,1] uniform distribution. Notice 
that  t
r
m t y y =
) ( *
,  if 
tc
t t y y <  and  t
r
m t y y ≥
) ( *
,  if 
tc
t t y y =  by construction. 
 
                                                 
43 To see how this works, note first that for ε ~ N(µ, σ
2), f(ε) = (2πσ
2)
-1/2exp(-0.5{ε-µ}/σ). Define z ≡ {ε-µ}/σ . It 
follows that F(ε) = Φ(z(ε)), where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function. Thus, 
   )) ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )) ( (








r r z F F z ε ξ ξ ε ξ ξ ε ε Φ − + = − + = = Φ  
In other words, drawing ε
(r) from a truncated distribution of (ε|ε≥ε
tc) is equivalent to drawing z
(r) = z(ε
(r)) from a 
truncated distribution of (z|z≥z
tc) and then transforming z
(r) back to ε
(r).  
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Appendix II:  Underlying Model Processes 
A1. Social Security Function 
 
  From the expected earnings profiles, we can calculate the lifetime summation of household 




= ∑ , where ej denotes the household earnings at 




w as the fractions of  ER  that are contributed by the husband and 
wife of the household, respectively.
45 Based on ER , φ
h and φ
w, we can approximate the 
household annual social security benefits as follows. 
 (a)  Calculate  Individual Primary Insurance Amount (PIA)
46 
 Individual  i’s annual indexed monthly earnings (AIME) can be approximated as 
  AIME E L
ii
R
i ≈ φ       ( 1 6 )  
with 
  LR
ii =× − 12 22 40 max{ , } 
where i = h (husband) or w (wife), and  L
i  is the number of months of i’s covered period.
47 
Without loss of generality, we set  L
w = 40 for single-male households and  L
h = 40 for single-
female households. 
 Individual PIA can be calculated as 
    










. min{ , } . min{max{ , }, }
.m a x { , }
 (17) 
where b0 and b1 are the bend points. For the 1992 formula, b0 = $387 and b1 = $2,333. 
                                                 
44 As opposed to a discounted present value of earnings, the summation is a straightforward summation of earnings 
in a common base-year currency unit which is the concept employed by the Social Security Administration. 
45 The terminologies “husband” and “wife” are not literal. In particular, we call a single male respondent “husband” 
and a single female respondent “wife.” Without this simplification, we need separate treatments for married and 
single households.  Under this generalization, φi
h  = 1 and φi
w = 0 for single-male households, and φi
h = 0 and 
φi
w = 1 for single-female households. 
46 Social security benefits derived from the calculations in this section are not precise because the calculated AIME 
may be smaller than the actual AIME and, conditional on AIME being correctly calculated, the calculated household 
benefits may be larger than the actual ones. For the former, the reasons are (i) we do not exclude 5 years of lowest 
earnings from calculation, (ii) we use base-year (i.e. real) values of earnings after age 60 instead of nominal values, 
(iii) we do not take into account earnings in retirement if respondents work beyond their household retirement dates.  
For the latter, the reason is that we assume both husband and wife of a married household are eligible for collecting 
benefits at the household retirement date. If one of them is not eligible at the retirement date, the approximation will 
overstate the benefits. Nevertheless, by virtue of having complete earnings histories for most individuals, our 
calculations are considerably more accurate than those in other life-cycle simulation models of wealth accumulation. 
47 Without the lower bound of 40 years in the max operator (max{R
i – 22, 40}), AIME would be too high for 
households whose members retire before age 62. In addition, notice that we use the household retirement date (R
i) 
rather than the individual retirement date.   47
 (b)  Calculate  Household Annual Social Security Benefits 
 First,  the  individual monthly social security benefits are calculated as 





i i s spouse i = max{ , , }
'   (18) 
where i’s spouse = h (w) if i = w (h), down
i  is the fraction of i’s PIA that i would get if i collected 
benefits based on i’s PIA, dspouse
i  is the fraction of PIA of i’s spouse that i would get if i collected 
benefits based on PIA of i’s spouse, and ssx
i  is the monthly benefit that i would get if i collected 
benefits based on PIA of i’s ex-spouse.
48 Without loss of generality, for single-male households, 










hh == == 0 for single-female 
households. In addition, we set ssx ssx
hw = = 0 for married households because we do not have 
any information to determine ssx
i . Similarly, ssx
i = 0 for any single households without 
information to determine their ex-spouses’ PIA. 
 Finally,  household  i’s annual social security benefits can be approximated as 
  ss ssb ssb ii
h
i
w =× + 12 ( )      (19) 
which, for a married household, is the benefits the household would get when both the husband 
and wife survive. When one of the spouses in a married household dies, the annual social 
security benefits of the surviving spouse is 





ww =× 12 max{ , }    (20) 
In other words, we approximate the surviving spouse’s benefits to be the higher of the husband’s 
and wife’s benefits that they would be able to collect on the basis of their own earning histories 
(which determine their PIAs) and the household retirement date (which determines the factors d). 
This approximates the actual guideline of the Social Security Administration. 
 
AII.2. Defined Benefit pension: 
  The annual defined benefit (DB) pension benefit is estimated as 
     
db DB UNION YRSV UNION YRSV e
DB UNION YRSV UNION YRSV e
DB DB














ββ β γγ γ φ
ββ β γγ γ φ
βξ
01 2 01 2
01 2 01 2
0
     (21) 
where the superscripts h and w indicate “husband” and “wife,” respectively. DB
i is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if i has a DB pension. UNION
i is a binary variable equal to 1 if i belongs to a 
union at the DB job. YRSSV
i is the number of years that i stays in the DB job up to i’s retirement 
date. eR  is the household earnings in the last period of work, and φ R
h  and φ R
w  indicate the 
fractions of eR  that belong to the husband and wife, respectively, with φφ R
h
R
w += 1 by 
construction. ξ is an error term that is assumed to be distributed as  N(, ) 0
2 σ ξ .
49 Finally, the 
parameters to be estimated areβββββββγγγγγγ 001201 2012012
bhhhwwwhhhwww ,,,,,,,,,,,, a n d  σ ξ
2. 
                                                 
48 To recover the ex-spouse’s PIA, we first compute the benefit amount that a single respondent would get based on 
her own earning history. Then, we compare the amount to the reported amount of social security benefits in the first 
wave that the respondent reported collecting the benefits. If the reported benefit amount is higher, we assume that 
the single respondent collected benefits based on her ex-spouse’s records and the reported amount is used to recover 
her ex-spouse’s PIA. 
49 The specification is estimated with ordinary least squares using the White formula for the standard error.  
  48
 db is calculated by assuming that the household receives annual DB pension benefits that 
are constant in real terms from the first period of retirement until none of the recipients survive. 















where δ j  is the discount rate that converts pension benefits at age j into an equivalent value of 
1992 dollars (i.e. having δ j  1992-dollars at age j is as good as having one 1992 dollar in 1992), 
and π j is the probability that the household will survive at age j conditional on surviving in the 
year that dbwealth was reported, R is the last period of work, and D is a terminal age (the 
household will not live beyond this age). The estimation results are given in Table A2. 
 
Appendix Table A2: Coefficient Estimates for Annual DB Pension Benefits 
Variable  Coefficient Estimates  Standard Errors 
Husband’s Estimate of Constant  1,914.9
*** (701.7) 
Husband’s Estimate of Union Status  -483.943  (613.2) 
Husband’s Estimate of Years in Service  47.9  (30.0) 
Husband’s Estimate of His Last-Period Earnings  -0.028  (0.024) 
Husband’s Estimate of His Last-Period Earnings Interacting 
with Union Status  0.008 (0.022) 
Husband’s Estimate of His Last-Period Earnings Interacting 
with Years In Service  0.004
*** (0.001) 
Wife’s Estimate of Constant  -245.366  (540.1) 
Wife’s Estimate of Union Status  1,108.1
*** (334.0) 
Wife’s Estimate of Years in Service  66.6
*** (22.6) 
Wife’s Estimate of Her Last-Period Earnings  0.013  (0.033) 
Wife’s Estimate of Her Last-Period Earnings Interacting with 
Union Status  0.003 (0.022) 
Wife’s Estimate of Her Last-Period Earnings Interacting with 
Years in Service  0.004
*** (0.001) 
Estimate of Constant if Both Husband and Wife Have a Pension  -168.864  (420.7) 
R
2  0.572 
N  2,203 
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AII.3. Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses 
 
We construct household annual medical expenses based on the (HRS-imputed) answers 
to the four medical expense questions asked in the 1998 and 2000 HRS. The four questions are: 
 
E10. About how much did you pay out-of-pocket for [nursing home/hospital/ 
nursing home and hospital] bills [since R’s LAST IW MONTH, YEAR/in the 
last two years]? 
 
E18a. About how much did you pay out-of-pocket for [doctor/outpatient 
surgery/dental/doctor and outpatient surgery/doctor and dental/outpatient 
surgery and dental/doctor, outpatient surgery, and dental] bills [since R’s 
LAST IW MONTH, YEAR/in the last two years]? 
 
E21a. On the average, about how much have you paid out-of-pocket per month for 
these prescriptions [since R’s LAST IW MONTH, YEAR/in the last two years]? 
 
E24a. About how much did you pay out-of-pocket for [in-home medical 
care/special facilities or services/in-home medical care, special facilities or 
services] [since R’s LAST IW MONTH, YEAR/in the last two years]? 
 
We construct household annual medical expenses as one-half of E10 + E18a + 24*E21a + E24a. 
The 1996 and 1997 household annual medical expenses are calculated from the information from 
the 1998 HRS and, similarly, the 1998 and 1999 household annual medical expenses are 
calculated from the information from the 2000 HRS. The sample included is all households 
(HRS, AHEAD, CODA, and WB) that participated in and retained marital statuses between the 
1998 and 2000 HRS. The estimation results are given in Table A3. 
 
Appendix Table A3:  Coefficient Estimates for the AR(1) Annual Medical Expenses 
Coefficient Estimates 
Group 
Group Constant  Age  0.01*Age





***  Single, No 
College  (0.018) (0.004)  (0.005) 




***  Single, 
College  (0.038) (0.007)  (0.009) 




***  Married, No 
College  (0.013) (0.003)  (0.004) 
0.869 0.948 0.519  18,228 
0.026 0.185
*** -0.121
***  Married, 
College  (0.017) (0.004)  (0.005) 
0.871 0.696 0.693 5,824 
 








AII.4. Estimates of Household Earnings Expectations. 
 
We construct household earnings as the summation of individual earnings for all adults in 
the household.  The estimates for the model of household earnings described in the text are given 
in Table A4. 
 
Appendix Table A4:  Coefficient Estimates for the Household AR(1) Earnings Profiles 
 
Coefficient Estimates 
Group  Group 
Constant  Age  0.01*Age
2  ˆ ρ   σ ˆ  
R
2 N 
4.758 0.231 -0.259  Single, No 
College  (0.022) (0.003) (0.004) 
0.58 0.46  0.065  43,339 
3.787 0.293 -0.316  Single, College 
(0.042) (0.007) (0.009) 
0.68 0.38  0.175  8,677 
6.753 0.173 -0.195  Married, No 
College, One-
Earner  (0.018) (0.002) (0.003) 
0.62 0.32  0.138  65,472 
5.157 0.264 -0.282  Married, No 
College, Two-
Earner  (0.038) (0.006) (0.007) 
0.70 0.31  0.283  15,779 
6.741 0.173 -0.187  Married, 
College, One-
Earner  (0.019) (0.003) (0.004) 
0.67 0.28  0.183  56,482 
5.003 0.259 -0.269  Married, 
College, Two-
Earner  (0.038) (0.007) (0.009) 
0.76 0.29  0.254  14,626 
Note:  The numbers of households for these groups are 1873, 351, 2076, 512, 1821 and 519 respectively. 
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 Table 1:   Descriptive Statistics for the Health and Retirement Study (dollar amounts in 
1992 dollars) 
Variable Mean  Median  Standard  Deviation 
1991 Earnings  $35,263  $28,298  $35,264 
Present Discounted Value 
of Lifetime Earnings  $1,691,104 $1,516,931 $1,193,969 
Defined Benefit Pension 
Wealth  $105,919 $17,371 $191,328 
Social Security Wealth  $106,714  $97,150  $65,140 
Nonpension Net Worth  $250,513  $107,000  $541,164 
Mean Age (years)  55.7  4.7 
Mean Education (years)  12.7  3.4 
Fraction Male  0.70  0.46 
Fraction Black  0.11  0.31 
Fraction Hispanic  0.06  0.25 
Fraction Couple  0.66  0.48 
No High School Diploma  0.22  0.41 
High School Diploma  0.55  0.50 
College Graduate  0.12  0.33 
Post-College Education  0.10  0.30 
Fraction Self-Employed  0.15  0.35 
Fraction Retired  0.29  0.45 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1992 HRS.  The table is weighted by the 1992 HRS household analysis 
weights.  
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Table 2:  Optimal Net Worth (excluding DB Pensions) and Optimal Wealth-to-Earnings 
Ratios for HRS Households (dollar amounts in 1992 dollars) 
 
Group  Median Optimal Wealth Target  Median Optimal Wealth-to-
Income Ratios
a 
All Households  $69,777  2.4 
    
No High School Diploma  $22,524  1.2 
High School Diploma  $70,383  2.5 
College Degree  $137,528  3.1 
Post-College Education  $178,924  4.0 
    
Lowest Lifetime Income Decile  $2,941  0.6 
2
nd Income Decile  $15,368  1.4 
3
rd Income Decile  $30,059  1.9 
4
th Income Decile  $48,200  2.1 
Middle Income Decile  $60,513  2.2 
6
th Income Decile  $83,399  2.6 
7
th Income Decile  $89,488  2.4 
8
th Income Decile  $106,724  2.5 
9
th Income Decile  $140,853  2.7 
Highest Lifetime Income Decile  $253,631  3.9 
 
Notes:  Authors’ calculations from the life-cycle model described in the text.  Calculations use the 1992 HRS 
household analysis weights. 
a Income is the average of the last 5 working years.   53
 
Table 3:  Percentage of Population Failing to Meet Optimal Wealth Targets and Magnitude 























18.6% $5,714  $69,777  $107,000 $97,150  $17,371 




20.9% $2,982  $22,524  $40,000 $71,774  $0 
High School 
Diploma 
19.1% $5,315  $70,383  $106,000 $97,086  $21,290 
College 
Degree 
14.7% $13,696  $137,528  $217,314 $127,167  $60,752 
Post-College 
Education 
16.1% $21,579  $178,924  $263,500 $126,691 $152,639 










































6.4% $29,062  $253,631  $395,889 $200,747 $123,192 
Notes:  Authors’ calculations as described in the text.  
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Table 4:  Correlates of the Probability that Households Accumulate Too Little Wealth 
  Probit Regression on Having a Wealth Deficit 
  dF/dx 
§ Standard  Error 
2nd Lifetime Income Decile  .016 .018 
3rd Lifetime Income Decile  -.005 .019 
4th Lifetime Income Decile  .015 .023 
5th Lifetime Income Decile  -.006 .024 
6th Lifetime Income Decile  -.021 .025 
7th Lifetime Income Decile  -.017 .028 
8th Lifetime Income Decile  -.061** .025 
9th Lifetime Income Decile  -.046 .029 
10th Lifetime Income Decile  -.043 .034 
Retired  .001 .011 
Has Pension  -.003 .011 
Social Security Wealth  -9.41e-08 1.88e-07 
Age  -.002 .001 
Male  -.007 .012 
Black  -.006 .012 
Hispanic  -.028 .015 
Married  -.272*** .017 
High School Diploma  .004 .012 
College Degree  -.009 .018 
Graduate Degree  -.000 .020 
Self-Employed  -.012 .014 
§ For dummy variables, dF/dx is a discrete change.  The mean probability of a deficit in the sample is .185.  The 
pseudo R2 for the probit regression is .1562 and sample size is 6,271. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.   55
 
Table 5:  Correlates of the Median Wealth Surplus 
  Median Regression of “Saving Adequacy” (Actual-Optimal Net Worth) 
  Coefficient Estimates  Standard Error 
Constant  -16,301.4** 6,946.8 
2nd Lifetime Income Decile  -1,253.3 888.9 
3rd Lifetime Income Decile  -915.6 1,293.4 
4th Lifetime Income Decile  -1,396.0 1,356.2 
5th Lifetime Income Decile  71.6 1,779.1 
6th Lifetime Income Decile  5,856.9*** 2,848.7 
7th Lifetime Income Decile  8,424.3* 2,912.1 
8th Lifetime Income Decile  13,482.3*** 5,237.6 
9th Lifetime Income Decile  17,853.1*** 6,860.9 
10th Lifetime Income Decile  56,459.3*** 5,420.9 
Retired  1,584.8* 1,055.6 
Has Pension  -1,849.6** 1,231.1 
Social Security Wealth  0.066*** 0.0 
Age  249.3* 124.2 
Male  -2,313.7* 1,316.1 
Black  -2,017.9* 1,019.2 
Hispanic  -769.6 1,668.0 
Married  8,957.8*** 1,620.3 
High School Diploma  667.4 1,041.8 
College Degree  3,849.5 2,223.6 
Graduate Degree  5,223.6 3,999.4 
Self-Employed  13,665.8*** 2,993.9 
Number of Children  -462.9** 212.4 
Number of Grandchildren  162.1** 72.4 
Subjective Probability of Living > 75  6.5 19.0 
Subjective Probability of Living > 85  -8.4 18.0 
Subjective Probability of Bequest > $10k  23.4*** 9.7 
Subjective Probability of Bequest > $100k  282.7*** 30.6 
Mid-Atlantic Division  471.8 4,344.8 
East North Central Division  -206.1 4,632.2 
West North Central Division  2,198.0 4,901.5 
South Atlantic Division  -45.1 4,989.6 
East South Central Division  121.2 4,776.4 
West South Central Division  -1,805.9 4,889.2 
Mountain Division  731.0 5,146.5 
Pacific Division  1,336.5 5,123.1 
§ For dummy variables, dF/dx is a discrete change.  Standard errors are bootstrapped in the median regression.  The 
pseudo R2 for the median regression is .0918 and the sample size is 6,271. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
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Naïve (save a constant fraction of Yt) 7.1 
Naïve (save an income-varying fraction of Yt) 11.4 
Modigliani (St=a+bYp) 16.1 
Constant Alpha  43.6 
Reduced-Form Regression Including 41 Years of Earnings  25.3 
Reduced-Form Regression Including Quadratic Terms for 41 Years of 
Earnings  29.7 
Monte Carlo Draws on Earning Sequence  41.1 
Base Case in Paper  83.7 
Source:  Authors’ calculations as described in the text.  57
Table 7:  Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Parameter Value  Percentage Failing to 
Meet Optimal Target 
Measure of fit: 
2 R (in %) 
Deficit Conditional 




0.97 β = ,3 γ = , 4% r =   18.6 83.7  5,714 
1.0 β =   25.6 85.5  6,242 
0.93 β =   14.1 81.3  6,567 
5% r =   24.7 85.1  6,000 
7% r =   38.9 77.3  18,752 
1.5 γ =   14.5 92.3  4,656 
5 γ =   35.7 84.8  11,131 
0.9 ρ =   27.6 68.9  18,634 




 Figure 1:  Median DB Pension Wealth, Social Security Wealth, and Net Worth 
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Figure 2:  Scatterplot of Optimal and Actual Wealth 
 
Source:  Observed net worth is constructed from the 1992 HRS.  Optimal net worth comes from 
solving the baseline model described in the text. 
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o line Figure 3:  Distribution of "Saving Adequacy"
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Source:  Authors' calculations from the baseline model and 1992 HRSFigure 4:  Distribution of "Saving Adequacy" (Observed Minus Simulated Non-
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Source:  Authors' calculations from the baseline model and the 1992 HRS